farm lifestyle. For much of its 26-year history, Organic Valley has achieved this mission. However, in the past few years a more hostile economic environment has emerged to test the resolve of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) George Siemon and the Organic Valley leadership team. This case shares the evolution of a determined, idealistic group of mostly small rural producers as they lead a farmer-owned firm from nothing but a dream to a complex multi-pool international cooperative. The current quandary: can the original mission of Organic Valley-to simultaneously deliver a stable producer pay price and an economically sustainable family farm life style to member suppliers-be maintained?
In the agricultural sector, producers are usually price takers and have minimal influence in determining the price they receive for their output. Since 1995, conventional milk price has fluctuated year to year, and often on a monthly basis. Price volatility increases the uncertainty and risk in farming. These create difficult and complex decision making environments, especially for small farmers because they have relatively lower margins and risk-bearing ability than large farmers. Cook and Marion (1981) argue that the more stable a price is for a given commodity, the larger the proportion of small farmers that will remain in the industry. Unstable prices drive larger farmers to invest and force the small farmers out of business (Cook and Marion 1981) . Organic Valley had a stable pay price policy throughout its history. Through chosen representatives, members contribute to the pricing decision. When assured of a stable pay price, it is assumed that farmers will concentrate on managing their production costs. However, when the costs of production increase to such a degree that their margins are zero or negative, farming is not economically sustainable under the stable price regime. This policy helps us understand the relations between stable pay price and economic sustainability.
The objective of this case study is to improve our understanding of economic concepts such as theories of the imperfect market, especially oligopsony models and their application to real world problems, and demand and supply theory. Further, we explore how factors that shift supply and demand affect prices, how conditions that control supply can affect and stabilize prices, and how innovative organizational forms enhance the probability of economic success. The case is also intended to help students improve their critical thinking and analytical skills by exploring the possibility of maintaining a unique sustainable and stable pricing method through the data provided. Additionally, the story introduces the economic role that an organic dairy operation might play for small and medium-size dairy farmers as they attempt to maintain an economically sustainable family farm lifestyle.
The Evolution of Organic Valley
The 1980s was an economically difficult decade for U.S. farmers. The globalization of commodity markets, excess production, double-digit inflation, interest rates approaching 20%, and consolidation in the food processing and input supply industries converged to lower gross and net margins at the farm production level. During the latter part of the decade many producers sold farm assets, combined operations with other families, restructured their operating and mortgage loans, suffered through foreclosures, or declared bankruptcy. In some instances, however, groups of farmers attempted to control their destinies by creating new organizational forms. This was the case of seven farmers near LaFarge, Wisconsin.
In late 1987, this group of farmers met to explore alternatives that might offer the opportunity to continue a way of life they did not want to forego. After four informal meetings, the Coulee Region Organic Producer Pool (CROPP) was founded in March 1988. This group's goal was to combine family farmers into a unified group to collectively market their organic output. They defined a family farm as "a farm owned and operated by families with a focus on protecting the land and supporting the community and rural economy for future generations," (Organic Valley 2013b) . CROPP was organized with distinct marketing pools. Shortly after cooperative incorporation, they established an organic dairy pool.
The newly-formed group was quick to action. By 1990, the Organic Valley ® brand was established and cheese was being marketed under the brand. Shortly thereafter, Organic Valley was marketing fluid milk. As the decade progressed, more organic products were added as the market opportunities appeared. By 2002, Organic Valley began marketing private label products, and within eight years private label output accounted for 25% of total revenue. Marketing branded, private label, and bulk products became the cooperative's three-pronged strategy (Organic Valley 2011) . By 2014, the cooperative approached one billion dollars in revenue, and offered more than 500 products in the organic food market.
Organic Valley: Organizational Structure and Operations
Organic Valley is structured as an international, multiple pool, centralized, and quasi-virtual closed membership agricultural marketing cooperative. The cooperative adds new members only when there is an increased demand for milk that cannot be met by current members. Organic Valley's marketing agreement requires members to deliver 100% of their milk to the cooperative, and has strict, enforceable termination clauses. Each member holds one share of Class A membership stock. This stock entitles members to a one-member, one-vote voting right.
In 1994, Organic Valley expanded its membership from Wisconsin into Minnesota and Iowa as it began the process of accessing raw material supplies regionally and then nationally. Consequently, the cooperative changed its name to the Cooperative Regions of Organic Producer Pools (CROPP) in 2001 to reflect a national organization with regional pools. Organic Valley now has members in 35 states, Australia, and three provinces of Canada (figure 1); the majority of their members are dairy farmers. In 2014, the cooperative was sourcing its organic milk from eight regional dairy pools 1 in 31 states 1 A definition of pooling taken from the textbook of Cobia (1989) : "Pooling is a method of handling products whereby lots of the same product from different producers are combined by grade (New York, Northeast, Midwest, Northwest, Rocky Mountain, California, Southwest, and Southeast; Organic Valley 2013a) . Such diverse membership enables the cooperative to build markets more efficiently, reduce the costs of production, and ensure a stable raw material supply. Currently, the cooperative is discussing possible further expansion of its global footprint (Preusser 2013) .
"Self-funding has been a key to Organic Valley's success," (Organic Valley 2013c) . This acceptance of membership responsibility permeates the Organic Valley culture as evidenced by the adaptation of self-funding equity capital acquisition policies and practices. From the beginning, Organic Valley issued preferred stock with a $50 face value and a maximum 8% interest rate or premium and contributors receive average net payments. Typically, each grower's products lose their identity and are treated collectively as one lot by grades. All producers receive the same average price for the specific grade. Multiple pools determine proceeds on the basis of two or more grades, varieties or periods." A board of seven directors, elected at large from the cooperative's membership, governs the cooperative. Board members meet once per month to discuss the cooperative's business. Executive committees, one for each commodity pool, report to the board of directors. Each commodity pool is divided into regional pools based on geographic locations. Representatives to executive committees are elected regionally. Executive committees are important to Organic Valley's governance in that they serve as a two-way conduit, communicating members' concerns and recommendations to and from the board. The dairy executive committee has monthly conference calls to discuss pay price, feed costs, or other members' concerns. A professional management team is responsible for day-to-day operations of the cooperative.
Background: Organic Industry
Sales of organic food in the United States increased from $1 billion in 1990 to $31 billion in 2012 (table 1). The U.S. organic food sector is largely driven by consumer demand (Greene et al. 2009; Dimitri and Oberholtzer 2009) . About three-quarters of U.S. consumers purchase some organic food each year, and one-quarter of consumers purchase organic food monthly. In order to assure national standards, the U.S. Congress passed the Organic Food Production Act in 1990. This law established the National Organic Program (NOP), which created uniform national organic food standards that were implemented in October 2002 (National Organic Program 2014).
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Due to higher production costs for organic food and to increasing consumer demand, organic food has commanded a significant premium over comparable conventional food products since 2000. For example, a half-gallon of organic fluid milk generated a 60-109% premium over conventional branded milk in 2006 (Smith, Huang, and Lin 2009) . In the 1990s, most organic food was sold in natural and specialty stores. By 2011, only 38% of organic food was sold in this category of store, and 55% of organic food was sold through traditional food retailers (Organic Trade Association 2012).
Organic dairy is the second largest segment of organic food after organic produce. 
Organic Milk Processors
The United States has two national organic milk buyers and processors: Horizon Organic, a subsidiary of WhiteWave Foods, and Organic Valley, a cooperative. These two rivals compete in organic milk procurement and organic dairy wholesale and retail markets. Both Organic Valley and Horizon Organic invest heavily in brand building, customer loyalty, quality, new product and new package development, and market analysis. In 2004, the organic fluid milk market share was 42% for Horizon Organic and 36% for Organic Valley; in 2007, these figures were 33% and 19%, respectively (Dimitri and Venezia 2007) . Their initial success encouraged the entrance of numerous local and regional enterprises, leading to the declines.
Horizon Organic, founded in 1990, was the first company to market fluid organic milk nationally. It was acquired in 2004 by Dean Foods and operated under the WhiteWave Foods Division until 2012, when Dean Foods spun off WhiteWave Foods as an independent company. WhiteWave Foods is a natural and premium food processing company owning well-known brands such as Silk, International Delight, Earthbound Farm Organic, Horizon Organic, and the European brand Alpro. Net sales of WhiteWave Foods in 2013 were $2.5 billon (WhiteWave Foods 2014). In 2013, Horizon Organic was the number one brand in organic dairy products, with 43% of the U.S. market share in organic fluid milk.
Organic Valley is the second largest organic milk processor (details are embedded in other part of this case). The third-largest organic milk processor is Aurora Organic Dairy, a private company located in Boulder, Colorado; it is vertically integrated, comprising large dairy farms and a processing facility. The main products of the company are privately labeled organic milk and butter (Aurora Organic Dairy 2014). Stonyfield is a premium organic yogurt processor located in New Hampshire, which sources milk from Organic Valley and independent producers. Other processors with brand recognition include MOO Milk in Maine, Trickling Springs, and Natural by Nature in Pennsylvania. Besides these prominent organic milk companies, about 50 smaller organic milk buyers or processors operate in the United States. Some of them are family-owned-andoperated facilities, and others are local or regional factories or cooperatives that handle both organic and conventional milk.
Organic Milk Supply
The National Organic Program, passed in the early 1990s but implemented in 2002, requires a three-year period for land, and one year for dairy cows to make the transition from conventional to organic production. Only 400 dairy cows, were certified as organic in 2004 due to the newly-enforced regulation (National Agricultural Statistics Service 2012). Since then, the number of certified organic dairy cows has grown gradually. By 2014, the total number of certified organic dairy cows in the United States had increased to over 235,000 (table 2) Organic Milk Pricing U.S. conventional milk prices are primarily market-driven, but regulated by the Federal Milk Market Order (FMMO) System. FMMO announces a blended minimal milk price each month for non-organic milk. Organic milk prices are largely determined by market conditions. The two major organic milk processors, Organic Valley and Horizon Organic, forward contract with their milk producers. Horizon Organic and Organic Valley's pricing protocols include four basic elements: a base price, seasonal premium, seasonal deduction (Organic Valley only), and market-adjusted premium.
Horizon Organic contracts with farmers for one to three years by setting prices with individual farmers confidentially (Horizon Organic 2007). Horizon Organic changed its market-adjusted premium (MAP) to reflect market conditions and production costs. Further, it has the sole right to reduce the pay price, based on market conditions with 30 days' written notice to its producers if the proposed price change is less than 25% (Northeast Organic Dairy Producer Alliance 2011). Organic Valley's farmer members collectively determine their pay price for the upcoming year based on current costs of production and a fair return (Organic Valley 2014c) . This pay price is announced early in the calendar year and is fixed for one year. Members within the same region receive the same price regardless of herd size. If market conditions or cooperative performance change within a given year, the board of directors has the right and responsibility to adjust the pay price. The historical base prices for Organic Valley have been consistently set higher than the base prices for Horizon Organic. Nevertheless, with added premiums, the two rivals' final annual pay prices generally converge. Final average differences range between 25g to $1.16/cwt (cwt = hundred lbs.) over the last seven years, as evidenced in table 3.
The observed base farm price for organic milk is more stable within a given year and also more stable in the long run than the conventional milk price. 
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Note: Asterisk indicates the Northeast regional price; Organic Valley charges a flat hauling fee for each member, and pays all members in the same region the same price, with no volume premium. MAP = market adjustment premium. Organic Valley also has regional premiums based on the cost of production. In the Northeast region, the premium was $3.25 in 2013; it has 11 regional premiums. Both firms offer component prices and quality premiums.
between organic and conventional milk prices was $10.90 in 2009. This difference decreased to $6.50 in 2013. The fluctuation in differences is primarily caused by variation in conventional milk prices. Comparing coefficients of variation (CV) for a five-year moving average between farm prices for organic and conventional milk, we observe that the CV values of conventional milk are much larger than the CV values for organic milk. The ranges are 16% for conventional and 10% for organic, and the means of these two CVs are significantly different at the 1% level ( figure 3 ). The CV is explained in figure 3 (lower CV values mean less variation). Organic Valley's base price is fixed at the beginning of the calendar year, but the cooperative pre-announces a one-dollar summer deduction in May, June, and July to balance the burden of the spring flush. Moreover, Organic Valley provides incentive payments in addition to its base price in January, February, and December (e.g., $2.00 in 2009 and 2010, and $3.00 per cwt from 2011 to 2013). Therefore, the actual monthly pay prices may vary from month to month (figure 4), but the producers are aware of these adjustments in advance. The price range paid to producers for organic milk between 2008 and 2013 was $5.98, compared to $10.80 for conventional milk during the same period.
Organic Valley's Balancing Act: Farmer Pay Price Stability
"Supply management is a critical part of maintaining our sustainable approach. The products our farmers produce must be utilized organically to ensure the premiums we all want for our labors. We want to maintain our stable price structure, and a key piece of this is providing the business with a stable and predictable level of production," (Peters 2009) . 00% 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 CV Conventional price CV Organic price Horizon Organic, and HP Hood licensed the Stonyfield brand for fluid organic milk. These transactions resulted in increased competition in the organic milk market, especially in milk procurement. Because of rapid growth in demand and lagged response in supply, Organic Valley was not able to supply all of its customers. Due to this tight supply-demand situation, Organic Valley decided to stop supplying 15 customersincluding Wal-Mart, its third-largest customer at the time-to ensure supply for its core natural food store customers (Pattison 2007 (table 4) . 4 In addition, the price of conventional milk decreased to about one-third the 4 Previous studies suggest that organic fluid milk is more price and income elastic than conventional milk, and income has a positive effect on organic fluid milk consumption (Dimitri and Venezia 2007; Alviola and Capps 2010) . Alviola and Capps (2010) report that income elasticity is 0.2672 for organic fluid milk, and −0.0135 for conventional milk, with price elasticity of −2.0046 for figure 5) . However, the organic milk supply headed in the opposite direction. In early 2009, the supply of organic milk continued increasing for the first eight months (higher than projected), thus increasing inventories and related costs. A potential crisis at Organic Valley loomed. The cooperative's values, polices, and practices would be tested.
To address this excess supply situation, Organic Valley's leadership considered three options: 1) recalculate the pay price based on actual monthly organic milk utilization; 2) terminate the membership of recentlyaccepted members; 3) collectively reduce production. The board acted quickly and decisively. After discussion and communication with members, the board of directors adopted the third option and recommended a quota system. The quota program required that each farmer reduce deliveries by 7% based on the average of the farmer's previous three years of milk production. Farmers were allowed to deliver more milk, but the overquota milk was priced at $15, considerably less than the annual pre-announced base price. The supply of organic milk decreased in September, and was significantly lower than projected for the following three months, making projected and actual supply growth converge. The pay price remained unchanged. As a result of the quota program, organic utilization increased to 94%, inventory was reduced 25%, from 12.2 to 9.2 million pounds, and the quality of the milk delivered by farmers increased. Total milk However, not all news was positive. During the recession, organic feed prices decreased between August 2008 and July 2010. In response, some organic grain farmers converted to conventional operations due to higher margins for conventional grain and lower margins for organic grain (Silva et al. 2012) . Severe weather in 2011 and 2012 in organic grain growing areas also diminished grain and feed yields. These factors reduced the supply of organic grain and feed. As a result, organic feed prices skyrocketed in 2011 and 2012. Organic livestock farmers, especially those who do not produce feed, were greatly affected by the high feed prices. Consequently, in the summer of 2011, a combination of these high feed costs and dry summer weather reduced organic milk supply significantly (Link 2012) .
Although the price of organic feed increased, Organic Valley's milk pay price remained fixed. The margin for organic milk was squeezed. Therefore, organic dairy farmers fed their herds less grain, leading to reduced milk production. As a result, the organic milk supply decreased in late 2011 and 2012. Retailers and consumers clamored for organic milk. In response to high feed costs, Organic Valley raised its pre-announced base pay price by $2.00 for the year 2012. However, this increase still did not cover the extraordinarily high feed costs. Consequently, some farmers sold part of their herds, and some fed them less, or lower-quality, feed. Further, a small number of farmers converted to conventional operations (Tampa Tribune 2012). These decisions further reduced organic milk supply. By late 2013, the average pay price for organic farmers in the Northeast was approaching the mid-$30 range, but the profitability of many farmers continued to be unsustainable (Parsons 2013) .
In June 2013, Stonyfield announced that it would begin sourcing a small portion of its milk from local organic dairy farmers rather than from Organic Valley (Lundgren 2013 Stonyfield's future actions regarding organic milk supply will have a profound effect on Organic Valley's milk procurement and utilization. As a preemptive move, in August 2013, Organic Valley farmers received notice from their cooperative that a second supply management quota would begin in October 2013. However, at the last moment, the quota was cancelled when the excess supply forecast was not realized (Organic Valley 2013c).
High feed costs, extreme weather, and rivals' tactics and strategies are putting farmers under extreme financial stress and are making it more difficult for Organic Valley's leaders to set a stable milk purchase price. Both undersupply and oversupply of organic milk challenge the cooperative's pay price and profit levels (Organic Valley 2012). Organic Valley and its farmers have experienced wide swings, particularly in the last ten years. Organic milk supply was short in 2004, 2011, and from August 2013 into early 2014. In contrast, the industry and Organic Valley were in an oversupply situation in 2009 and 2010. This increasing volatility creates a dilemma for Organic Valley's leadership since much of the cooperative's original appeal was based on a platform of family farm economic sustainability and stable pay prices.
Organic Valley's Balancing Act: Family Farm Economic Sustainability
Organic Valley promotes social, environmental, and economic sustainability. Economic sustainability is the root and mission of Organic Valley, and drives the operation of the cooperative.
Organic Valley's Economic Sustainability
"The continued success of the cooperative's branded products is the foundation of a sustainable pay price to farmers," said Mike Bedessem, Chief Finance Officer (Organic Valley 2014a). The cooperative invests heavily in marketing branded products to increase the reputation of Organic Valley and deepen brand loyalty. Organic Valley differentiates itself from investor-owned firms by emphasizing its farmer-owner roots and by involving member farmers in sales, marketing, and consumer awareness events. In addition, Organic Valley invests heavily in consumer research and marketing, and applies a threepronged sales strategy to increase its organic utilization and improve revenue. Organic Valley's revenues increase during most years, but net income is more variable (figure 6). At the beginning of each fiscal year, the board of directors sets a profit target for the cooperative. Historically, the profit level is set to return approximately 2% of sales. Once the profit target is met, the cooperative shares additional profits with Another concern for Organic Valley's board and management is leadership succession. Well-managed leadership succession, especially at the senior management level, is essential for the long-term sustainability of Organic Valley. Many of the cooperative's senior managers have worked at Organic Valley for more than 10 years and have collectively instilled the organization with a unique culture. CEO George Siemon is one of Organic Valley's founding members. Dairy Pool Director Jim Wedeberg is also a founding and active member. Chief Operational Officer Louise Hemstead started working at Organic Valley in 1993 and is also an active member. Finding qualified replacements for these senior managers who are approaching retirement is critical to maintaining Organic Valley's long-term vision, as well as long-term growth. Acknowledging this concern, the Organic Valley board increased the budget for staff training and started an annual farmer leadership symposium in 2011.
Interdependency of Price Stability and Economic Sustainability
During the 1990s, family farmers were forced to exit farming due to low margins generated from production agriculture. Organic produce prices offered a substantial premium over conventional produce prices and a promising market opportunity. High price and strict cost controls were the key factors for survivability in a depressed production agricultural sector. For Organic Valley's members, economic sustainability means that farming can provide enough profit for farmers to make a living, so farmers can stay on their land and maintain farming as a profession, a career, and a lifestyle. In addition, the next generation of farmers could remain in production agriculture if they so choose.
The tool Organic Valley adopted to provide economic sustainability is the stable farm gate price policy, which states that the farm pay price is determined by farm members and based on what the farmers actually needed to generate a reasonable income (Organic Valley 2014b) . Through this yearly consensus building process, Organic Valley sets the target pay price for organic milk, which is considered economically viable for the sustainability of organic dairy farmers. This pricing method is considered unique and progressive by incorporating farmers' input into the price-setting process. Organic Valley farmers feel they are in a better position to control their costs of production than to control product market pricing. By setting the organic milk price one year ahead, organic dairy farmers concentrate on improving farm management practices and strategies to control their production costs. The fundamental goal of Organic Valley, that is, to provide a stable and economically sustainable pay price, complements their practice of paying farmers first and operating on the remainder.
5
Farmer Members ' Economic Sustainability: Is Organic Dairy Economically Sustainable? Due to increasing consumer demand, organic milk sales and margins increased dramatically before the 2009 U.S. economic recession. Indeed, organic dairy farmers had better economic returns than their counterparts operating in the conventional milk industry (Krieg 2007; Kilman and Reddy 2012) . During this period, numerous conventional milk producers converted to organic dairy operations and experienced significant improvement in financial returns (McCrory and Parsons 2013b; McCrory et al. 2013; McCrory and Parsons 2013a) .
The economic recession decreased consumer demand for both organic and conventional dairy products. The organic dairy farmers' revenue decreased by 10% on average, but conventional dairy farmers' revenue decreased by 40% in 2009 (Barham 2010) . A major reason that the organic dairy farmers had higher returns was because of Organic Valley's supply control program. Through the self-imposed quota system, Organic Valley was able to maintain a higher and stable pay price. Exhibit 12 provides an example.
The period between 2009 to 2013 was economically difficult for conventional and organic dairy farmers. This is especially the case for small farmers because of their relative cost disadvantage. Nationally, organic and conventional dairy farms of all sizes saw a negative net return during this period, except for farms with more than a thousand cows (table 5 and see supplement 4 for more information). In both the organic and conventional categories, large dairy farms have higher returns than smaller ones due to economies of scale. However, in the group of dairy farms with less than 100 cows, organic dairy farms outperformed conventional dairy farms, especially in terms of return on operating costs. Organic dairy farms have higher overhead and unpaid labor costs than conventional dairy farms of similar size, but the opportunity cost for unpaid labor affects dairy producers differently. Many small dairy farmers are willing to accept a lower return on their labor because they appreciate the family farming lifestyle. These farmers' major production decisions are based on operating costs, especially short-term production decisions (McBride and Greene 2010) . This is why many small dairy farmers converted to organic production systems in the late 1990s and early 2000s-to save their farms financially. A well-governed and managed organic cooperative provides small dairy farmers with a greater opportunity to stay in the business and gives their children a chance to remain in farming (Campbell 2005) . A recent study found that organic dairy farmers in Minnesota had positive profits from 2006 to 2013 and these profits were higher than the profits earned by conventional dairy farmers of similar size (table 6) . Another recent longterm study of organic dairy farmers from 2004 to 2013 by Parsons and his colleagues found that profits are decreasing, larger farms are outperforming smaller ones, and half of organic dairy farmers cannot make a reasonable living wage if current margins are not increased. However, Parsons' study also shows that organic dairy farmers with better management skills have a probability of generating higher returns.
Uncertainty and Challenges
Organic Valley's founders aimed to create an organization with unique rules, rights, and responsibilities in order to help family farmers maintain an economic and social livelihood consistent with their values and beliefs. However, due to the uncertainty of demand and supply, as well as rapid structural changes within the industry, members and management are starting to ponder whether the original dream on which Organic Valley was founded is still achievable. At 
